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ABSTRACT 
Drawing conclusions largely from democracies, existing theories often positively associate judicial independence 
with political competition.  This Article argues that a negative relationship exists in some authoritarian or hybrid 
regimes that prefer independent courts: political competition reduces a regime’s control over local agents, decreasing 
its ability to protect the judiciary from external intervention.  To test this hypothesis, the Article compares China’s 
ongoing judicial reforms with similar reforms in Russia, which were both aimed to make courts more independent 
from local elites.  However, while both achieved some success in cutting formal ties between frontline judges and 
powerful local actors, informal channels for exercising extrajudicial influence remain available in both countries.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to suppress these channels in part because he was dependent upon local 
elites’ support in elections.  China’s “advantage” of being unconstrained by democratic formalities, however, 
allowed President Xi Jinping to better control the behavior of local officials and court leaders, significantly reducing 
external court interference.  Consequently, China’s judicial reforms seem closer to achieving some limited version 
of judicial independence than their Russian counterparts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why do countries—or more precisely, politicians—support judicial 
independence from other government branches?  One explanation is 
insurance theory, which argues that politicians facing intense political 
competition are more likely to support judicial independence because they 
believe an independent judiciary will better protect their rights, liberties, and 
preferred policies once they lose power.1  Another explanation focuses on 
incumbents’ ability to interfere with the judiciary: intense political 
competition makes it difficult for incumbents to intervene in the judiciary 
without significant political backlash from the opposition and the public.2  
However, these theories are largely informed by observations of 
democracies. 3   Do they apply in countries with authoritarian or hybrid 
regimes?   
This Article argues that political competition has the opposite effect on 
judicial independence under hybrid and authoritarian regimes that 
demonstrate a preference for independent courts.  Such regimes, which have 
grown considerably in number over the past few decades, 4  may want a 
judiciary with some degree of independence for many reasons, including 
attracting foreign investment, improving legitimacy, and strengthening 
administrative compliance within the bureaucracy.5  However, most of these 
regimes face a daunting task: even assuming adequate success in establishing 
formal protection for judges (e.g., life tenures), local courts will likely remain 
 
 1 See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
IN ASIAN CASES 247–50 (2003) (“[W]here two or three parties of roughly equal strength are 
engaged in constitutional design, . . . [t]hey therefore may prefer a system of judicial review where 
a court has extensive formal powers . . . .”); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts:  
A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741–43 (1994) (“By politicizing appointments but 
depoliticizing control, in short, [American political leaders] augment their influence during periods 
when they are out of power.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political 
Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003). 
 2 See, e.g., Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a New 
Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 595, 620 (2005); Julio Ríos‐Figueroa, Fragmentation of Power and the 
Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994–2002, 49 LAT. AM. POL. SOC. 31, 39 (2007). 
 3 See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 1; Brinks, supra note 2; Ramseyer, supra note 1; Ríos-Figueroa, supra 
note 2; Stephenson, supra note 1. 
 4 See Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: the Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics, in 
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1–2 (2008) (“In many 
different countries, the scope and impact of judicial authority are expanding, and judges are making 
decisions that were previously reserved for majoritarian institutions.”); Peter H. Solomon Jr., Courts 
and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes, 60 WORLD POL. 122, 135 (2007) (referencing nondemocratic 
countries that have “empowered and used their courts”). 
 5 See Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 4, at 4 (identifying primary functions of courts in authoritarian 
states). 
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subject to many external interventions.  This is because these countries’ 
judiciaries are usually heavily intertwined with local elite networks, which 
serve as informal vehicles through which powerful local actors can intervene 
in court cases despite formal barriers.  And without the mechanisms usually 
present in democracies—such as free media and civil society—the courts are 
powerless to defend themselves without the help of the regime leadership.  
To protect courts from external interventions through these networks, the 
regime must assert tight control over its local agents and their rent-seeking 
behaviors.  Such control necessitates highly consolidated power within the 
central leadership.  However, political competition, even under an 
authoritarian system, will likely oblige the central leadership to rely on local 
elites to maintain its power, which can undermine the regime’s effort to 
protect the courts from external interventions. 
This Article tests the above hypothesis by examining the judicial reforms 
of two authoritarian countries—Russia and China.  Both countries suffered 
decades of judicial dependence on local governments, leading to frequent 
external interventions in court cases.  In recent decades, both countries 
launched ambitious and largely genuine reforms aimed at increasing their 
judiciaries’ independence from local elites.  The Russian reforms began in 
the late 1980s and lasted through the mid-2000s, and the Chinese reforms 
started a couple years after Xi Jinping became President in 2012.  Evidence 
from various sources—such as surveys, interviews, and cross-country 
indexes—suggest that despite establishment of similar formal protections for 
courts and judges, the less competitive regime (China) made more progress 
in promoting judicial independence.  For example, according to the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators, China’s Rule of Law (“ROL”) 
Indicator rose from -0.54 in 2012 to -0.26 in 2017.6  In contrast, Russia’s 
Rule of Law Indicator dropped during its judicial reforms.  From 1996 (the 
year of the World Bank’s earliest report) to 2006, Russia’s indicator 
decreased from -0.79 to -0.95.7  This finding is consistent with the prediction 
that political competition is negatively associated with authoritarian and 
hybrid regimes’ ability to achieve judicial independence. 
 
 6 The ROL Indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher numbers representing a higher level of 
confidence in abiding by the rules of society—in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.  Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc 
(follow “Interactive Data Access” hyperlink, select “Table View,” and check “Rule of Law” and 
“China”) (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
 7 Id. 
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This Article—particularly Part IV, focused on China—draws on findings 
from fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2018.  The fieldwork included 
sixty-seven in-depth, one-on-one interviews with legal professionals from 
Zhejiang, Chongqing, and Yunnan, including thirty-four judges from eight 
courts and thirty-three lawyers from seven law firms.8  Scholars who had 
connections with the courts and law firms arranged the interviews, which 
were semi-structured and lasted from 20 minutes to 2.5 hours.  Interviewees 
were asked to describe and evaluate the implementations of specific reforms 
on the local courts, including the judicial accountability reforms (司法责任
制改革) and the judicial centralization reforms (人财物上收). 
I.  POLITICAL COMPETITION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: 
FRAMEWORKS UNDER DIFFERENT REGIME TYPES 
A vast body of literature discusses the relationship between judicial 
independence and political competition, and most studies find a positive 
association.  One prominent explanation is insurance theory, which argues 
that incumbents in competitive political systems tend to cede power to the 
judiciary to prepare for potential loss of power, as an independent judiciary 
is better able to protect their interests when they leave office.9  For example, 
William Landes and Richard Posner argue that an independent judiciary is 
likely to ensure that legally enacted policies are implemented even after the 
politicians who enacted them lose power. 10   Similarly, Mark Ramseyer 
argues that incumbents facing intense competition will likely support judicial 
independence because doing so ensures that the judges they appoint can 
 
 8 These interviews are coded using two letters and a number: the first letter indicates whether the 
interviewee was a judge or lawyer (J: Judge, L: Lawyer); the second letter indicates which province 
the interview was conducted in (A: Zhejiang, B: Chongqing, C: Yunnan); and the number indicates 
the interview number. For example, an interview could be coded as “JA01” or “LB02.” 
 9 See, e.g., GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 247–50 (“Because . . . no party can predict with confidence that 
it will be able to maintain power indefinitely, it makes sense for all parties to adopt judicial review 
as an alternative forum in which to challenge government policy . . . .”); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY : THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (contrasting judges who are “merely agents of the current legislature” 
with an independent judiciary that would “interpret and apply legislation in accordinace with the 
original legislative understanding”); Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 741–43; see also Stephenson, supra 
note 1. 
 10 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (contrasting judges who are “merely agents of the current legislature” 
with an independent judiciary that would “interpret and apply legislation in accordinace with the 
original legislative understanding”). 
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protect their preferred policies from future officeholders.11  However, some 
scholars challenge insurance theory by pointing out that it does not seem to 
apply in less developed democracies.  For example, Aylin Aydın argues 
that—due to factors such as public distrust in the judiciary and lack of media 
oversight—power holders in less developed democracies can interfere in 
judicial decisions at relatively low political cost.12  Consequently, the short-
term benefits that incumbents can obtain from interfering in court cases may 
be higher than the long-term “insurance” benefits of supporting judicial 
independence.13 
A related line of literature stresses the positive relationship between 
political fragmentation—often a result of heightened political competition—
and judicial independence.  According to this theory, judges tend to act 
independently only when the political landscape is fragmented—often 
through frequent alteration of parties or gridlock within the government—
because such fragmentation prevents political actors from effectively 
retaliating against the courts.14   For example, Daniel Brinks argues that 
political fragmentation in Brazil protected its judiciary from over-
politicization, as judicial appointments and disciplinary actions were 
controlled by politically diverse entities without “a truly monolithic political 
environment.”15  Julio Ríos-Figueroa similarly argues that power fragmenta-
tion limits coordination among elected government branches, which reduces 
a government’s ability to retaliate against objectionable court decisions.16  In 
contrast, when a dominant party effectively controls judges’ careers, it will 
use such power to punish those who decide cases contrary to government 
positions.17 
 
 11 See Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 741–43; see also GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 247–50 (“Because . . . no 
party can predict with confidence that it will be able to maintain power indefinitely, it makes sense 
for all parties to adopt judicial review as an alternative forum in which to challenge government 
policy . . . .”); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY : THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Stephenson, supra note 1. 
 12 See Aylin Aydın, Judicial Independence Across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political 
Competition, 47 L. & SOC'Y REV. 105, 111–14 (2013). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 60–61 (2003); Brinks, supra note 2; Ríos-Figueroa, 
supra note 2. 
 15 Brinks, supra note 2, at 620. 
 16 Ríos‐Figueroa, supra note 2, at 49. 
 17 J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN 60–61 (2003) (“[T]he Secretariat uses its control over 
personnel matters to create a distinctly political set of incentives. . . . [J]udges who decided cases 
contrary to government positions seem to have suffered in their careers . . . .”). 
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Most of these studies, however, pay little attention to the relationship 
between political competition and judicial independence under authoritarian 
and hybrid regimes, which together account for almost half of all countries.18  
These countries often have good reason to want a court system that is 
politically loyal to the regime but otherwise independent from external 
interventions.  Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa list five primary 
functions of courts in authoritarian and hybrid countries:  
(1) establish social control and sideline political opponents, (2) bolster a 
regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy, (3) strengthen administrative 
compliance within the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and solve 
coordination problems among competing factions within the regime, (4) 
facilitate trade and investment, and (5) implement controversial policies so 
as to allow political distance from core elements of the regime.19  
Many of these functions, such as bolstering legitimacy and solving 
coordination problems among factions, can only be effectively managed by 
a court system that is reasonably independent from the government, except 
in the rare cases involving the regime’s core interests.  Indeed, some 
authoritarian and hybrid governments have made considerable efforts to 
increase their courts’ independence.20  For example, Hootan Shambayati 
describes how the Turkish military twice changed the country’s 
constitutional law, each time making the judicial system significantly more 
independent from the legislative and executive branches.21  Similarly, the 
authoritarian government in Egypt established a constitutional court with 
“considerable independence from regime interference,” which was used to 
signify to potential investors the regime’s resolve in protecting private 
property.22  Here, the same questions emerge: Does political competition 
affect the willingness and ability of these regimes to pursue (limited) judicial 
independence?  If so, how? 
The relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence under authoritarian or hybrid regimes is very different from 
 
 18 See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2018: ME TOO? POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION, PROTEST AND DEMOCRACY 2 (2019), http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/White
paperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2018.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy2018. 
 19 Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 4, at 4. 
 20 See, e.g., infra notes 21–22. 
 21 Hootan Shambayati, Courts in Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: The Judicialization of Turkish (and 
Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 290–
95 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008). 
 22 Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt,  in RULE 
BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 138 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom 
Ginsburg eds., 2008). 
 
536 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:2 
that under democracies, partly because their courts operate within drastically 
different environments.  In a democracy (especially a consolidated 
democracy), a local government official must consider a range of factors 
before intervening in a court case, for example: the free media may reveal 
such intervention to the public; the public will likely be outraged by an attack 
on judicial integrity; and high levels of public participation and a vibrant civil 
society ensures that anyone found interfering with the courts will pay a high 
political price.23  Under an authoritarian or hybrid political system, however, 
judges usually do not have these protections from external intervention: the 
media is generally not free; the public is accustomed to external court 
interference; and the state’s monopoly on power leaves limited ways to 
punish such behavior.  In other words, under these regimes, judges essentially 
stand alone when faced with the vast network of executive power—and thus 
have little choice but to submit to its influence unless other external forces 
intervene on their behalf.  
As a result, under an authoritarian or hybrid regime, a judiciary’s best 
ally (if any) is often the political leadership in the central government.  From 
a cost-benefit perspective, the central leadership usually has many more 
reasons than local agents to desire the court system be independent from 
local elites.  For example, although a local government’s intervention in a 
court case might weaken the entire regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy, the 
specific local government will bear only a fraction of such damage; the 
central leadership, as the representative of the regime, will suffer the direct 
consequences of lost legitimacy.  Moreover, one important benefit of a 
relatively independent court, namely strengthening the administrative 
compliance of local bureaucracies, can only be enjoyed by the central 
government.  Indeed, such benefit is normally detrimental to local 
governments, as it likely chips away at their discretion and rent-seeking 
opportunities. 
It is also quite clear that local governments bear most “costs” of judicial 
independence.  The vast majority of external interventions in court cases are 
local in nature because they are usually made at the request of local 
enterprises, officials’ friends and relatives, or other powerful local figures.24  
 
 23 See Aydın, supra note 13, at 113–14 (“[I]n order for the citizens to efficiently hold the officials, who 
intervene in the judiciary accountable, the electorate (1) has to be informed about the wrongdoings 
of the incumbents . . . (2) has to have high levels of confidence in the judiciary and (3) has to be 
capable and willing to punish the incumbent.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a 
One-Party State, 37 L & SOC. INQUIRY 848, 855–56 (2012). 
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The central leadership, on the other hand, only interferes in the judiciary 
under relatively rare circumstances, such as in cases involving prominent 
political dissidents or core national policies. 25   Moreover, the central 
leadership has more political tools at its disposal, allowing it to control the 
outcomes of such cases without resorting to case-by-case intervention.  For 
example, a central leadership sometimes changes laws or even amends the 
constitution to “legalize” its crackdown on political opponents.26   It also 
normally controls judges’ careers, which is often enough to secure 
judgements favorable to the regime in cases with high political stakes.27  
Therefore, the central leadership often has an incentive to promote judicial 
independence from local politics at the expense of its local agents. 
Assuming the leaders of an authoritarian or hybrid regime want to push 
for more judicial independence from local elites, they must accomplish two 
things: formal protection of judges through institutional arrangements and 
sufficient control of local government agents to shield judges from informal 
interventions.  It is relatively easy for the central leadership to establish 
formal protections for judges and courts through laws or constitutional 
amendments, as it usually controls the national legislative process. 28  
However, scholarship on courts in developing countries has long found that 
formal judicial independence (e.g. life tenure and secured budgets) correlates 
 
 25 See, e.g., Interview with LC06, Partner, Anonymous Law Firm, in Yunnan, China (July 12, 2018) 
(describing a case where the central government used courts to enforce the policy of terminating all 
commercial leases on military-owned lands) (on file with author). 
 26 See, e.g., Li-ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 20 PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 1, 58–59 (2002) (describing an instance in which the Singapore government legislatively 
overruled an unappealing Court of Appeals decision by amending the constituion and the Internal 
Security Act). 
 27 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 403 (2015) (“In 
1986 a senior trial judge [in Singapore] was transferred to the attorney general’s office after he 
ruled in J.B. Jeyaretnam’s favor in a politically charged case.”); see also Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: 
The Exception That Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 83–84 (Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2008) (“Singapore’s 
legal judicial community had been sent a very clear message about what might happen to judges 
whose rulings were not finding favor with the government . . . .”). 
 28 See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, The Role of Law, in PUTIN’S RUSSIA: PAST IMPERFECT, FUTURE 
UNCERTAIN 83, 86 (Stephen K. Wegren ed., 6th ed. 2016) (discussing the depoliticization of the 
Russian judicial selection process under Yeltsin, including life tenure of for all judges); Ceren Belge, 
Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 L. 
& SOC'Y REV. 653, 662–63 (2006) (“The new court was granted constitutional review power . . . 
and it was provided with a high level of formal independence from the political establishment. . . . 
Additional guarantees on tenure security ensured that no one could tinker with the independence 
of the court without violating the constitution.”). 
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poorly with behavioral/actual judicial independence.29  A key reason for this 
divergence is the existence of informal means of intervention.  For example, 
although federal judge nominations in Russia are made by the Judicial 
Qualification Commission (which consists mainly of sitting judges), it is 
reported that decisions have been heavily influenced by lobbying from court 
chairs, local officials, and even private businesses.30  Such informal practices 
give local elites opportunities to curry favor with judges and interfere with 
their cases despite formal barriers established by the regime. 
As mentioned previously, in democracies, mechanisms such as free media 
and vibrant civil society significantly raise the cost of intervening in the courts 
through these informal channels.31  Under authoritarian and hybrid regimes, 
which usually lack these mechanisms, however, it is crucial that the central 
leadership otherwise control its local agents and discourage informal court 
interventions.  One common tool for controlling these local agents is the anti-
corruption campaign, which in theory should discourage local court and 
government officials from intervening in court cases as a way of exchanging 
favors—a major source of external influence over the judiciary. 
However, the effectiveness of an anti-corruption drive—or any other 
form of central control over local agents—is often negatively associated with 
political competition under authoritarian or hybrid regimes.  Political 
competition often creates political fragmentation, which weakens the central 
leadership’s ability to control its local agents.  In particular, when 
competition takes the form of elections, a central leadership will usually need 
its local agents’ help to garner votes, either legally (such as through 
connections with local voters) or illegally (such as through election fraud).  
The more competitive the election, the more help is needed.32  Such political 
 
 29 See, e.g., Brinks, supra note 2, at 597–98 (asserting that institutional judicial independence, such as 
secure tenure and salary, “correlate[s] poorly (indeed, often negatively) with actual independent 
behavior on the part of the courts”); Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 
WORLD POL. 587, 587–88 (2012) (“[J]udicial independence, while perhaps enabling, does not 
automatically or inevitably lead to positive independence.”). 
 30 Alexei Trochev, Judicial Selection in Russia: Towards Accountability and Centralization, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 
387 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006) (“Russia's judicial bureaucracy dominates the 
process of staffing courts from top to bottom, inviting collusion between the heads of the judicial 
corps, governors, and private businesses, who actively lobby for their preferred judicial 
candidates.”). 
 31 See Aydın, supra note 13, at 113–14. 
 32 See, e.g., Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a 
One-Party State., 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848 (2012) (noting that the Chinese government tackles 
judicial corruption by adopting “measures mainly aimed at reducing corruption at the lower level 
without changing the system as a whole”). 
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reliance on powerful local actors inevitably chips away at the central 
government’s ability to shield the judiciary from informal interventions; how 
can the central leadership expect local officials to manufacture votes on its 
behalf when it aims to eliminate their rent-seeking opportunities?  In other 
words, under an authoritarian or hybrid regime, greater political competition 
might reduce the regime’s ability to control its local agents, thus curtailing its 
ability to pursue judicial independence. 
Compared to similar discussions of judicial independence in 
democracies, the term “judicial independence” in this Article focuses more 
on external interventions from local actors rather than those from the central 
government.  Judicial independence is usually defined as the degree to which 
judges decide cases on the bases of law and case merits, without interferences 
from other actors, including both central and local governments.33  However, 
interventions from local governments are typically much more prevalent 
under hybrid and authoritarian regimes than in democracies.  As discussed 
earlier, the lack of protective mechanisms, such as free media and civil 
society, make it easier for powerful actors in non-democracies to intervene in 
court cases.  Since the controversies in most cases are local rather than 
national, external interventions from local actors (often in the form of rent-
seeking activities) are much more common than those from the national 
government.  In contrast, local interventions are much less frequent in 
democracies due to the high costs associated with the above-mentioned 
protective mechanisms—which is why theories about judicial independence 
in democracies are generally more concerned with national actors who have 
the power to appoint judges.34 
The proposed theory does not suggest that political competition is the 
only factor—or even the most important factor—accounting for varying 
levels of judicial independence in authoritarian and hybrid countries.  Many 
other factors, such as a country’s size and diversity, its legal culture and 
tradition, and even its leadership’s commitment to the concept of “rule of 
law,” may significantly impact an authoritarian or hybrid regime’s 
willingness and ability to pursue or maintain judicial independence.  This 
Article aims to test the proposed theory by comparing two countries that 
 
 33 For general discussions on the definition of judicial independence, see Brinks, supra note 2, at 596–
602 (discussing the different definitions and taxonomies of judicial independence); Christopher M. 
Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 605, 608 (1996).  
 34 See generally J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 721 (1994); Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning 
of a New Millennium?, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 595 (2005). 
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resemble each other in these other factors but have considerably different 
levels of political competitiveness.  
II.  WHO BETTER CHAMPIONED JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? COMPARING 
JUDICIAL REFORMS IN RUSSIA AND CHINA 
To test its hypothesis about the relationship between political competition 
and judicial independence, this Article compares the recent judicial reforms 
in China with similar reforms in Russia, which were implemented between 
the late-1980s and the mid-2000s.  These two countries were selected based 
on their many similarities relevant to the subject of this Article.  Prior to their 
respective reforms, both countries had highly dependent court systems.  For 
decades, the local Communist Party branches and executive agencies in both 
countries had treated the courts as subordinates. 35   In addition, unlike 
consolidated democracies, both countries lack the factors that can deter 
external court intervention—such as free media and civil society. 36  
Furthermore, China and Russia are both large and diverse countries, which 
means local governments have considerable administrative discretion and 
informational advantages vis-à-vis the central government.37  This means 
that any attempt by the central government to tightly control its local agents 
is politically difficult.  Most importantly, both countries launched 
institutional reforms, such as centralized judicial appointment systems and 
court budgets, aimed at boosting their courts’ independence from the 
influence of powerful local actors.38   These similarities allow meaningful 
comparisons between the outcomes of the two countries’ reforms. 
 
 35 See Ling Li, The “Production” of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One-
Party State., 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848 (2012); Peter H. Solomon Jr., Authoritarian Legality and Informal 
Practices: Judges, Lawyers and the State in Russia and China, 43 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST 
STUD. 351, 353 (2010). 
 36 See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 18. 
 37 Vladimir Gelman, The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism, 48 RUSS. POL. L. 7, 14–15 (2010) 
(noting that the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the weakening of “the coercive capacity 
of the center” and  the transfer of “the most important levers of government, including powers in 
the sphere of institutional regulation, from the center to the local level.”); Yongnian Zheng, 
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Also essential to this comparison, during the period of the judicial 
reforms, the two countries differed on the main variable of interest (i.e., level 
of political competition).  Even after Putin had consolidated his power and 
turned the country into a fully authoritarian regime around the mid-2000s, 
Russia maintained some competitive elements, thanks in part to the 
constitutionally mandated democratic formalities. 39   Many politicians—
including Putin and other members of his United Russia party—must 
periodically face popular elections to maintain their legitimacy to rule.40  
Although heavily manipulated, these elections are not meaningless—even 
Putin himself has felt the need to boost his popularity and manufacture votes 
to avoid being embarrassed at the ballot.  China, on the other hand, has long 
been a constitutionally one-party state with almost no meaningful popular 
elections beyond the lowest level of government.41  This has allowed Xi 
Jinping to govern without much competitive pressure since successfully 
eliminating his factional rivals in the center.  In other words, although neither 
Putin nor Xi face immediate threats to their personal rules, Russia has more 
political competition than China, as Putin and his allies must maintain their 
legitimacy through winning popular elections. 
Given this contrast between the two countries, the traditional theory 
about the relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence predicts that Russia will have more successful judicial reforms 
due to its higher level of political competition.  The theory presented in this 
Article, on the other hand, suggests that the Chinese leadership is better able 
to protect the courts from external interference due to its superior ability to 
control its local agents. 
III.  JUDICIAL REFORMS IN RUSSIA: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
Russia’s judicial reformation was a lengthy process that spanned from 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency to Putin’s.   During the final years of the 
Soviet Union, Gorbachev advocated for pravovoe gosudarstvo, which is the 
 
 39 See, e.g., Noah Buckley & Ora John Reuter, Performance Incentives Under Autocracy: Evidence 
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ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506868. 
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Russian translation of Rechtsstaat or rule of law.  He sought to eliminate the 
Communist Party’s control over the judiciary in several ways.42   First, he 
changed judges’ terms from five to ten years and transferred appointment 
power from the party apparatus at the same administrative level as the judges 
to the regional legislature at a higher level. 43   Second, for all judicial 
appointments and removals, the new system required preliminary screening 
by the Judicial Qualification Commission, which consisted entirely of 
judges.44  Finally, Gorbachev made intervention in court cases a criminal 
offense.45 
Although Gorbachev lost his power before completing these reforms, the 
trend of judicial modernization continued under President Boris Yeltsin 
throughout the 1990s.  In 1992, a law gave life tenure to all judges,46 subject 
only to an initial three-year probationary term. 47   The 1993 Russian 
Constitution established that judges be appointed by the President and that 
higher court appointees be confirmed by the Federation Council.48  The 
President’s appointments are largely based on the recommendations of the 
Judicial Qualification Commission—“a noteworthy reversal from the 
previous system in which judges served at the pleasure of the Communist 
Party.”49  Furthermore, the 1996 Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ, 
On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation, eliminated the Ministry 
of Justice’s oversight of the judiciary and created the Judicial Department 
within the Supreme Court, which is responsible for personnel, organization, 
and resource support of the judicial system.50  These changes ensured the 
formal independence of the judiciary from executive influence.  
However, when Yeltsin stepped down in 1999, he left a court system that 
was dependent upon the regional and local governments.  The economic 
crisis of the 1990s badly damaged the Federation’s ability to fund the courts, 
which lacked money to repair deteriorating buildings, purchase office 
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supplies, or even pay judges’ salaries.51  As a result, courts throughout Russia 
were forced to take “supplementary payments” from local and regional 
governments.52  According to a survey conducted by Peter Solomon and 
Todd Foglesong, 58% of courts received financial help from local 
governments in 1996 and 1997.53   Although such assistance was usually 
small, half of the surveyed judges “admitted that the contributions produced 
in them a sense of gratitude to local governments and that their sponsors 
seemed to have expectations from the courts.”54 
Perhaps more importantly, the local and regional governments gained 
significant power over the appointment of judges within their jurisdictions, 
largely due to the general decentralization of political power during the 
Yeltsin Era.  Although the 1993 Constitution theoretically established a 
unitary court system whose judges were appointed by the President and the 
Federation Council, the system in practice was quite messy.  Some regional 
leaders directly asked Yeltsin to appoint specific judges, while others refused 
to accept the unitary system and continued to appoint judges on their own.55  
Yeltsin compromised by seeking consent from the regions on judicial 
appointments, thereby establishing the appointment of judges as an area of 
joint jurisdiction between the federal government and the regions.56  The 
most obvious indication of the regions’ political clout is the 1996 Federal 
Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ, which stipulates that the appointment of 
lower, general jurisdiction judges requires approval from regional 
legislatures, effectively giving the regions veto power over the majority of 
judicial appointments.57  Under these circumstances, it was reported that 
“federal elites . . . sometimes lobbied regional governors to influence 
President Yeltsin’s choice among judicial candidates.”58 
Putin partially reversed this trend of dependency.  Early in his presidency, 
he famously made the slogan “dictatorship of law” the hallmark of his 
administration—a phrase that “reflected Putin’s real, even naïve, faith in 
laws as the basis for political order.”59  Reversing Yeltsin’s course, Putin 
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offered judges important formal protections against local intervention by 
significantly centralizing both fiscal and appointment power over the Russian 
judiciary. 60   The surge in oil prices allowed Putin to channel far more 
resources into the courts than his predecessor.61  Under the Plan for the 
Improvement of the Courts, 2002–2006, large sums of money were used to 
raise the salaries of judges, hire more court staff, and repair court buildings.62  
A second plan, starting in 2007, continued this trend of ensuring the courts 
were well funded by the federal budget.63  Thanks to the new funds, the 
courts are no longer financially dependent on local governments.  Putin also 
eliminated the regional consent requirement for judicial appointments in 
2001 amid opposition from several regions.64  Alexei Trochev noted that “it 
is widely believed that President Putin himself rather than governors, 
oligarchs, or judicial bosses will have the final say” in judicial appointments, 
representing another dramatic departure from the Yeltsin Era.65  
However, these reforms, which lasted from the late-1980s to the mid-
2000s, had limited impact on cases in which powerful local actors might 
interfere through informal channels.  For low-stakes cases, it was found that 
“judges decide cases in accordance with their bona fide interpretation of the 
law,” but for high-stakes cases, powerful people usually prevail.66  In these 
cases, the Soviet practice of “telephone law”—defined as “a practice by 
which outcomes of cases allegedly come from orders issued over the phone 
by those with political power rather than through the application of law”—
remained widespread.67  It should be noted that these high-stakes cases were 
not limited to the famous ones concerning the Kremlin, such as the Pussy 
Riot and Khodorkovsky cases.68  More often, it was political and economic 
elites in the localities that improperly influenced the outcomes of court cases, 
including the thousands of criminal cases orchestrated by the business rivals 
of the defendants.69  In effect, this created a “dualistic” legal system: the same 
judge would resolve the vast majority of mundane cases according to the law, 
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while bowing to extrajudicial influences in cases involving important national 
and—more frequently—local powerful actors.70 
Surveys suggested that the public also viewed the post-reform courts as 
untrustworthy when ordinary citizens opposed the rich and powerful.  
Between 2004 and 2012, Levada conducted five large-scale surveys 
(n=1,600) on the attitudes of Russian citizens towards the courts and other 
law enforcement institutions.  When asked if they believed the courts would 
defend citizens against the abuse of power by law enforcement, less than 30% 
answered positively—about 5% answered “definitely yes” and 25% 
answered “yes,” 71  while 39–44% answered “no” and 15–18% answered 
“definitely no.”72  Similarly, in a 2014 national survey that asked Russian 
citizens about their trust in government institutions, only 26% responded 
that the judiciary “deserved” their trust, while 45% answered that it “did not 
fully deserve” their trust and 17% that it “did not deserve [their trust] at 
all.”73  In contrast, 79% and 54% said that the President and the church 
deserved their trust, respectively.74  Such poor confidence in the judiciary is 
also reflected in Russia’s abysmal performance in the World Bank’s Rule of 
Law Indicators, which measure the perceptions of “a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents” on various law-related 
indicators, including “fairness of judicial process” and “judicial 
independence.” 75   From 1996 to 2017, Russia’s Rule of Law Indicator 
ranked in the lowest 16–28% among all measured countries, roughly on par 
with Pakistan (18–26%), and remained low throughout the period despite 
reforms.76  In her 2007 fieldwork, Kathryn Henley also found that Russian 
citizens generally reported skepticism about the law’s ability to protect them 
from elites and—more specifically—“a weariness with the claims of 
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successive post-Soviet regimes to be moving closer to the ‘rule of law’ through 
institutional innovations.”77  
Why would Russian judges bow to power when they enjoy life tenure and 
other institutional protections?  Although the judicial reforms established 
formal barriers between the courts and other local actors, less formal 
channels through which judges can be compromised have remained.78  For 
example, although in theory judicial nominations are based on the 
professional opinions of the Judicial Qualification Commission, it has been 
reported that the commission’s recommendations are “often under the de 
facto control of the chairs of the regional courts.”79  Thus, the appointment 
process is tainted by “collusion between the heads of the judicial corps, 
governors, and private businesses, who actively lobby for their preferred 
judicial candidates.” 80   Perhaps more importantly, court chairs have 
significant discretion in disciplining judges through the Judicial Qualification 
Commission, which often gives considerable deference to court chairs on 
matters of disciplinary action.81  As a result, “the chairs of courts retained 
considerable discretion . . . to punish judges who showed political immaturity 
by giving too many acquittals or refusing to cooperate in a case with a 
powerful intervener” 82  and “[j]udges are expected to conform to 
expectations of their chairs . . . regarding their verdicts and decisions.”83  
Such loopholes enable practices such as “telephone law” to thrive despite the 
various institutional protections established by the judicial reforms. 
However, the existence of these loopholes does not necessarily mean they 
are widely utilized.  The Russian central government’s—including Putin’s—
lack of control over local and regional elites, especially over their rent-seeking 
activities, also facilitates court interference, including collusion between these 
elites and the court chairs.84  After all, it is difficult for the “weakest branch” 
to resist demands from powerful local actors without some form of political 
 
 77 Hendley, supra note 67, at 246. 
 78 See, e.g., Trochev, supra note 30, at 387; Peter H. Solomon Jr., Informal Practices in Russian Justice: 
Probing the Limits of Post-Soviet Reform, in RUSSIA, EUROPE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 79, 85 (Ferdinand 
Feldbrugge ed., 2007). 
 79 Trochev, supra note 30, at 387. 
 80 Id. (citations omitted). 
 81 See Peter H. Solomon Jr., Informal Practices in Russian Justice: Probing the Limits of Post-Soviet Reform, in 
RUSSIA, EUROPE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 85 (Ferdinand Feldbrugge ed., 2007). 
 82 Id. at 84. 
 83 Id. at 85. 
 84 NOAH BUCKLEY, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INST., CORRUPTION AND POWER IN RUSSIA 12 
(2018), available at https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/buckley.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2019). 
 
Feb. 2020] THE MORE AUTHORITARIAN, THE MORE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? 547 
protection, even if institutional arrangements guard its formal independence.  
In authoritarian countries like Russia, where free media and public 
supervision are in short supply, such protection may only come from a 
central government that prefers its judiciary be relatively independent from 
local elites.85   
To be sure, Putin did drastically centralize Russian politics, especially 
compared to the highly decentralized structure of the Yeltsin Era.  He 
created a new layer of government above the states and appointed his 
representatives to govern them, thereby reducing the state governors’ direct 
access to the central executive.86   He strengthened the vertical chain of 
command in the regional offices of several federal agencies.87  He created a 
new political party, United Russia, to recruit and control local and regional 
politicians.88  He even abolished the direct election of governors in 200589 
and replaced it with presidential nomination.90  In theory, these changes 
should make it easier to prevent local governments from intervening in court 
cases.  
In reality, however, such centralization of power was aimed at providing 
political stability and—more importantly—guaranteeing election results that 
were favorable to Putin and his United Russia party, rather than limiting the 
rent-seeking activities of regional and local officials.91  This was due in part 
to Putin’s and United Russia’s reliance on these actors’ resources—including 
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“compliant regional assemblies, courts and electoral commissions”—to 
deliver favorable results in national and local elections.92  For example, after 
eliminating gubernatorial elections, Putin reappointed the vast majority of 
the governors who were elected prior to 2005, as they had demonstrated their 
loyalty to him by delivering votes for United Russia, sometimes through 
massive election fraud.93  These appointments “showed no sign that [Putin] 
had any interest in fighting corruption and political stagnation.”94  Indeed, 
under the new arrangement, corruption became “the glue that helps keep 
[Putin’s] regimes together by rewarding insiders and co-opting them into a 
unified structure.”95  It was observed that “[t]urning a blind eye to their 
corrupt practices is a reward for loyalty.  Pyramids of corruption thus 
incentivize low-level bureaucrats who otherwise may not help the regime 
drive voter turnout.” 96   Some scholars characterize this arrangement as 
“freedom [for local elites] . . . in exchange for maintaining local order and 
authority”97 or “retention of [the local elites’] monopoly power in exchange 
for the ‘right’ election results.”98  It is therefore unsurprising that Putin did 
little in his first two terms to meaningfully curb rent-seeking behaviors,99 
including the use of less formal channels (such as “telephone law”) to interfere 
in court cases, despite his growing power over local elites.100 
Russia’s experience thus serves as a cautionary tale for legal reformers, 
especially those under authoritarian and hybrid regimes.  Although the 
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installation of formal protections for judges—such as life tenure and financial 
independence from local governments—might enable them to act 
professionally in the majority of mundane cases, local elites can still find less 
formal ways to influence court cases in which they have interests at stake.  
While the free media and public supervision in democracies may provide 
mechanisms for checking such behaviors, in authoritarian regimes like 
Russia’s, such mechanisms are usually lacking. 101   Without additional 
political support from the central government to protect the courts from local 
elites, judicial reforms yield only limited improvements in rule of law metrics 
such as independence from local executive branches.102   
IV.  JUDICIAL REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING: A BETTER START? 103 
The judicial reforms under Xi Jinping share many features with the 
previously described Russian reforms, at least judging by their rhetoric and 
stated goals.  Like Putin and his predecessors, Xi promised to bring “rule of 
law,” which includes making courts more independent from local 
governments and frontline judges more independent from their superiors.104  
In 2013, the Xi administration issued a resolution on its reform agenda, 
which included broad pledges to establish so-called “rule of law” China.105  
Specifically, it promised to ensure “the independent exercise of the 
judicial . . . power in accordance with the law.” 106   Among the various 
measures designed to achieve this goal, two are particularly relevant to 
judicial independence: (1) the judicial centralization reform, which aimed to 
transfer power over local judge appointment and local court budgets from 
the local government to the provincial government107 and (2) the judicial 
accountability reform, which promised to eliminate court leaders’ power 
over the cases handled by frontline judges.  
The implementation of both reforms started soon after the resolution.  In 
2014, the central government officially authorized six provinces to pilot these 
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reforms,108 and in 2015, the Supreme People’s Court officially laid out the 
specific reform measures for the entire Chinese judiciary.109  About a year 
and half later, the Supreme People’s Court declared that most reform tasks 
“had been basically accomplished.”110 
In actuality, however, the centralization was only partially successful.  
Prior to the reform, power over local courts’ personnel and budgets was 
mostly controlled by local governments. 111   Regarding personnel, the 
centralization reform attempted to transfer the power to appoint and remove 
local court presidents, vice-presidents, and judges to the provincial 
governments. 112   According to the interviewed judges, the power over 
frontline judges has been completely centralized at the provincial level in all 
three provinces.113  The power over presidents and vice-presidents, however, 
merely appears to have been transferred to the provincial governments, with 
much actual power either remaining with the local governments or 
transferring to the higher courts.114  The failure to completely transfer power 
over presidents and vice-presidents is largely logistical in nature: unlike 
appointing judges, which involves only uniform tests and interviews, 
appointing a president or vice-president requires personal knowledge of the 
candidate.  Given the large number of courts in a Chinese province, many 
provincial governments simply lack the capacity to manage so many 
people.115 
Similarly, the centralization of fiscal power has been successful in only 
some regions.  In Zhejiang, the local governments still pay the local courts.116  
In Chongqing and Yunnan, the provincial government pays the salaries of 
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judges and other court employees,117 but the local governments of these two 
large cities pay judges significant bonuses based upon their workloads.118  
These bonuses can constitute a significant portion of a judge’s paycheck, 
sometimes more than fifty percent. 119   Such uneven implementation is 
caused by the economic disparities among different regions.  Local 
governments in large cities are much richer than their rural and small-city 
counterparts and can therefore afford to pay their judges more generously.120  
Since provincial governments often lack sufficient funds, they opt to allow 
local governments in developed regions to continue these payments to the 
local courts.  However, despite these setbacks, the centralization of personnel 
and fiscal power still represent a significant step towards the judiciary’s 
formal independence from local executive branches. 
Compared to the centralization reform, the judicial accountability 
reform was implemented much more thoroughly.  Prior to the reform, a 
judge’s opinion usually needed to be co-signed by either a division head or a 
court president/vice-president before becoming valid.121  Since the reform, 
a court opinion goes into effect right after being issued by the judge or the 
panel of judges that tried the case.122  The reform also limits the scope of the 
adjudication committee’s case reviews.  Before the reform, many court cases 
that involved relatively large monetary, social, or political stakes were 
transferred from frontline judges to the adjudication committee, which 
consisted of court leaders, including the president, vice-presidents, and 
division heads.123  The new rule stipulates that the committee only review 
“major and complicated cases” that involve “foreign affairs, security and 
social stability,” or difficulty in “the application of law.” 124   During the 
interviews, many judges confirmed that courts have used the committees less 
frequently following the reform.125  This reform effectively eliminated the 
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main formal channel through which court leadership could influence the 
outcomes of court cases.  Judges described their post-reform role as 
“independent judging,” “complete independent handling of cases,” and “the 
last gate.”126  
As in Russia, local elites in China can still utilize informal channels to 
convey their preferences in court cases, even though the formal channels 
have been narrowed or closed by the above-mentioned reforms.  Although 
the centralization reforms have reduced local governments’ power over court 
personnel and finances, local judges still rely on local officials for less formal 
“assistance.”  During the interviews, judges relayed many instances in which 
local government collaboration was critical to their job.  One judge said that 
he depends on the local village’s committees to find defendants who must be 
served notices. 127  Another said that he sometimes asks the local police to 
send a police car to his detached tribunal128  to protect the judges from 
agitated litigants.129  These largely discretionary forms of assistance rendered 
by local officials, although much less formal than the power over court 
personnel and finance, inevitably serve to maintain the judiciary’s 
dependency despite the centralization reforms. 
Similarly, while the accountability reforms curtailed court leaders’ formal 
power over cases handled by frontline judges, they did not eliminate their 
ability to influence these judges’ decisions through less formal means.  Like 
the court chairs in Russia, Chinese court leaders hold great power over the 
advancement of frontline judges. 130   One lawyer explained: “[A]fter the 
reform, if the judge insists on a specific result, then the leaders have no way 
to force him/her to change the decision.  But such insistence will be disad-
vantageous to him/her in the longer term, as it will negatively affect his/her 
relationship with the leaders.”131  Therefore, despite the centralization and 
accountability reforms, local elites still find informal ways to influence 
frontline judges’ decisions. 
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Nonetheless, it seems that the Chinese government was somewhat more 
successful than its Russian counterpart in reducing the use of these informal 
channels of extrajudicial influence due to Xi Jinping’s superior ability to 
control China’s local bureaucrats.  According to some judges and lawyers, 
extrajudicial interference has been steadily decreasing since 2013, two years 
prior to the launch of the judicial reforms.  Soon after Xi became president 
in 2012, he started to push for centralization of government power, especially 
through a rigorous anti-corruption campaign.  Some observers consider the 
campaign to be the longest and most sustained attack on rent-seeking 
activities in the post-Mao era.132  Unlike Putin, whose centralization cam-
paign resulted only in co-optation of local elites, Xi’s initiatives more 
directly—and more effectively—suppressed rent-seeking activities by 
powerful local actors.  The large-scale prosecution of corruption has made 
local officials more cautious when informally interfering with court cases, as 
these behaviors are now more intensely scrutinized. 
At the same time, Xi has chosen to use the courts and formal laws as a 
chief venue for controlling the local bureaucracy under the banner of 
“governing according to the law.”133  During the interviews, several judges 
and lawyers reported that they were invited or hired by the local government 
to help with “governing according to the law,” including evaluating the 
legality of governmental policies and the investment projects of state-owned 
enterprises.134  Combined, these two moves—strict control over the behavior 
of local governments and the empowerment of the local courts—have given 
the judiciary unprecedented space to exercise its power in localities, and 
lawyers and judges recognize this improved legal environment.  For example, 
one lawyer commented:  
Now when clients ask us: “Do you have guanxi with the court?”  We will say 
confidently: “We do not have guanxi, but you need to believe in the judges 
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and the system.  The old ways are gone.  The court decisions will not deviate 
too much from what the law requires.”135 
Similarly, the head of the administrative law division in a primary court 
discussed her experience regarding the changing environment:  “twenty 
years ago, . . . the court was indeed subjected to the control of the [local] 
government in all aspects. . . . Now . . . the administrative agencies do not 
dare threaten us.”136 
The combination of the judicial reforms and the changing legal 
“environment” seems to have altered litigants’ perceptions of the courts.  
Among the thirty lawyers who were asked to comment on the effect of the 
reforms on extrajudicial interference, twenty-four answered that they 
resulted in more independence for judges vis-à-vis their superiors and less 
extrajudicial influence on their cases.137  Many lawyers attributed the change 
to the accountability reform, especially to the elimination of the case 
approval system.138  Others pointed to the improving legal environment that 
leads to a reduction of informal influence on their cases.139  
Why was Xi Jinping able to control his local agents and offer courts 
protection from informal interventions while Putin largely failed?  One 
important reason is that Xi, unlike Putin, does not face the competitive 
pressure of popular elections.  The Chinese Constitution clearly stipulates 
that the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) is not subject to political 
competition from other political parties, 140  and decades of practice has 
confirmed that the CCP’s position is unchallenged by competitive elections.  
To be sure, the power of top leaders in China could be constrained by 
factional competition within the CCP.  The most prominent example is the 
fierce competition between President Hu Jintao’s faction (Tuan Pai) and 
former-President Jiang Zemin’s faction (Shanghai Gang) in the 2000s, which 
severely fragmented Chinese politics on both the central and subnational 
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levels.141  However, Xi Jinping, with no apparent affiliation to either of these 
two main factions, unexpectedly consolidated his power by crushing his 
opponents with his ruthless anti-corruption campaign.  Once Xi eliminated 
meaningful competitors from within the regime, he no longer needed to 
worry about political competition—in stark contrast with Putin, who must 
confront elections despite holding an unchallengeable position within the 
ruling coalition.  As a result, Xi was able to swiftly centralize control over the 
local government through political campaigns (e.g., anti-corruption and 
“governing according to the law”) and institutional arrangements (e.g., the 
supervision apparatus) with minimal resistance and little political cost to his 
power.  
However, China’s current “success” in this regard is only successful 
relative to Russia’s abysmal record.  Despite recent progress in reducing 
extrajudicial influence, most Chinese courts are still far from what can be 
legitimately described as “independent.”  This is especially true in less 
developed regions.  Kwai Hang Ng and Xin He argue that there are two 
types of courts in China: “work-unit” courts, which mostly exist in rural and 
less developed areas, and “firm” courts, which mostly operate in urban and 
more developed regions.  “In work-unit courts, judges are accustomed to ask 
before making any consequential decisions.”142  Judges in firm courts, on the 
other hand, are more inclined to rule based on law and are less influenced 
by extrajudicial factors. 143   This distinction was confirmed by several 
interviewed lawyers who have litigated in multiple jurisdictions across China.  
For example, one Chongqing lawyer said: “The judicial environment in 
Shanghai is better than Chongqing and other provinces.  But places that 
have such a good environment are rare.  Beijing is not as good, and 
Chongqing is even worse.  But Chongqing is already the best in the 
Southwest region.  Guizhou is the worst.”144  Therefore, although it seems 
that China is on a better track than Russia, building a judiciary that is 
reasonably independent from local elites across the whole of China will likely 
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take a very long time—even with the current level of political support from 
a powerful central leadership. 
V.  COMPARISONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
When comparing Xi Jinping’s judicial reforms with their Russian 
counterparts, the similarities are obvious.  They both use the term “rule of 
law” without committing to the liberal ideologies normally associated with it.  
More specifically, both Xi and Putin aimed to centralize power over their 
courts’ personnel and finances to make the judiciary more independent from 
powerful local actors.  Both also tried to reduce judges’ dependence upon 
court leaders.  Russia did so by professionalizing the appointment process 
and granting life tenures to judges, while China eliminated the case approval 
system and limited the jurisdictions of adjudication committees.  
Such similarities seem to suggest that the Chinese reforms will lead to 
poor outcomes.  Years after the Russian judicial reforms, President 
Medvedev famously said that Russia remained “a country of legal 
nihilism.”145  His view echoes the surveys that indicate the Russian people’s 
continuing distrust of the judiciary and formal laws despite years of reforms 
and arguable progress.  Such pessimism is not without reason.  “Telephone 
law” still plagues cases involving the interests of powerful figures, which 
reinforces the negative impressions of the courts held by citizens since the 
start of the Soviet Union.146  Does this mean that the judicial reforms in 
China—a country that is similarly large, authoritarian, and relatively 
underdeveloped with a long history of highly dependent courts—will suffer 
the same fate? 
Not necessarily.  According to the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators, which have provided a standardized indicator on “Rule of Law” 
since 1996,147 China’s judiciary seems to have achieved significant progress 
during the tenure of Xi Jinping.  In 2012, the year Xi became President, 
China’s Rule of Law Indicator was -0.54, ranking within the lowest 35.68% 
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of all countries.148  These numbers have since steadily risen.  In 2017, China’s 
ROL Indicator grew to -0.26, and its ranking rose to 44.71%.149  Although 
some of Russia’s reforms predate the dataset, their latter effects are 
discernable.  In 1996, Russia’s ROL Indicator was -0.79 with a ranking of 
24.62%; by 2006, these numbers had decreased to -0.95 and 18.66%. 150  
Although these decreases do not necessarily imply that Russia’s judicial 
reforms negatively impacted judicial independence,151 they do suggest that 
these reforms have not met their stated goals.  Moreover, these data echo the 
previously discussed surveys and scholarship on Russia as well as the author’s 
interviews with Chinese judges and lawyers.  Taken together, this evidence 
suggests that the authoritarian regime in China did a better job than its 
Russian counterpart in achieving its courts independence from external 
influences.  Why is this? 
A key reason is that Russian leaders face more political competition than 
their Chinese counterparts, even as Russia has become a fully authoritarian 
regime under Putin.  To be sure, neither Xi nor Putin face any real challenge 
to their personal hold on power—both leaders successfully established 
themselves as the single dominating figure in domestic politics just a few years 
into their presidencies.  However, Russian politics remains more competitive 
than Chinese politics.  The Economist Intelligent Unit’s 2018 Democracy 
Index report labels both China and Russia as authoritarian regimes, with 
Russia’s general democracy score (2.94 out of 10) lower than China’s 
(3.32).152  However, Russia performed better in both “electoral process and 
pluralism” (2.17) and “political participation” (5.00) than China (0.00 and 
3.89, respectively), indicating that the Russian regime is considerably more 
competitive than China’s despite both being fully authoritarian.153  These 
numbers largely reflect differences between the two countries’ constitutional 
arrangements.  While both are authoritarian regimes, Russia has a formally 
democratic constitution that requires regular elections.  China, on the other 
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hand, is a constitutionally one-party state, which means politicians do not 
face the pressure of popular elections.  
In line with the hypothesis of this Article, China’s “advantage” of having 
less political competition makes a considerable difference in its ability to 
promote judicial independence from local elites.  As mentioned earlier, 
Russia’s democratic formality forces Putin and his allies to periodically face 
elections for various executive and legislative posts.  To win these elections 
by a comfortable margin—and thus maintain the legitimacy of his dictatorial 
rule—Putin relies on local agents to deliver enough votes, often through 
large-scale election fraud.  In exchange for such acts of loyalty, Putin tolerates 
these local officials’ rent-seeking behaviors, including their interventions in 
the court system—an arrangement that significantly undermines Russia’s 
quest for judicial independence.  On the other hand, as Xi Jinping does not 
face popular elections, he has little need to make such a deal with local 
agents—at least not for the same political reasons as Putin.  Consequently, 
he is able to tighten his grip on local elites and suppress their rent-seeking 
activities, which include interference in court cases.  Therefore, compared to 
Russia, China’s relative success in achieving judicial independence may be 
partially attributed to the regime’s lower level of political competition.  
That said, this Article does not suggest that the difference in political 
competition is the only factor—or even the most salient factor—that 
accounts for the different outcomes of China’s and Russia’s pursuits of 
judicial independence.  Many other variables may also have had significant 
impact, such as the presidents’ personal commitments to the idea of rule of 
law (or rule by law), the effectiveness of the anti-corruption apparatus, the 
socio-political-legal culture, etc.  The argument here is that the level of 
political competition is one important variable that explains variance in the 
effectiveness of the judicial reforms in these countries. 
It is important to note that a lack of political competitiveness can also 
pose problems for judicial reforms under authoritarian or hybrid regimes.  
The flip side of China’s “advantage”—that the top power is not bound by 
democratic formalities or other institutional constraints—is its high 
dependence on the individual leader, which brings considerable 
unpredictability to any reform that requires long-term commitment.  As 
discussed previously, given China’s regional disparities, achieving a 
reasonable level of court independence from local elites across China would 
inevitably take a long time.  However, Xi’s control of local elites is highly 
dependent upon both his dominance over factional competitors in the central 
government and the centralization of local governments’ power.  If either of 
these elements diminish, progress towards a more powerful and autonomous 
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judiciary might halt.  Therefore, while one can conclude that Xi Jinping has 
done better than the Russians at achieving judiciary independence thus far, 
only time will tell if he accomplishes anything close to his promise of “rule of 
law China.” 
CONCLUSION 
Traditional theories often attribute a high degree of judicial 
independence to intense political competition.  Insurance theory argues that 
when faced with a high probability of defeat, incumbents will move to 
strengthen the judiciary’s independence to protect their rights and preferred 
policies from future incumbents.  Others argue that political competition 
often creates political fragmentation, which prevents a government from 
taking coordinated action against a judiciary that defies it.  Both theories thus 
predict a positive relationship between political competition and judicial 
independence. 
However, this Article proposes that the opposite relationship exists in 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes that prefer judicial independence, as 
political competition hampers the central leadership’s ability to prevent its 
local agents from intervening in court cases.  Due to these regimes’ lack of 
mechanisms that politically protect judicial independence (such as free media 
and civil society), their judiciaries are extremely vulnerable when faced with 
local government intervention.  Under such circumstances, the central 
leadership is often the best ally of the court, as the regime may believe that it 
can benefit from a judicial system that is independent from local elites.  To 
achieve this goal, the central leadership must shield the courts from external 
interventions, which requires both institutionalized protections and highly 
centralized control over local governments’ rent-seeking behaviors.  
However, if factional or electoral competition causes regime fragmentation, 
it is difficult to achieve such centralized political control, which means 
political competition is likely to hamper the path towards judicial 
independence in these regimes.  
This Article tested this theory by comparing the judicial reforms in China 
and Russia, both of which aimed at making the courts more independent 
from external influences.  While both countries established similar 
institutional protections for the courts, such as centralized appointment 
systems and budgets, China was significantly more successful in reducing 
external interference.  A key reason is that the Russian leadership must face 
regular elections, which are an importance source of legitimacy under their 
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formally democratic constitution.  Even as Russia has become a fully 
authoritarian country, Putin still needs the votes for both himself and his 
United Russia party to maintain his power and legitimacy, which has led to 
his reliance on local agents to garner votes through both legitimate and 
illegitimate means.  Such reliance has resulted in the arrangement of 
“retention of [the local elites’] monopoly power in exchange for the ‘right’ 
election results,”154 which prevents Putin from effectively controlling his local 
agents and protecting the courts from their interventions.  In contrast, due to 
China’s status as a constitutionally one-party state, China’s central leaders 
face little competitive pressure from popular elections.  This “advantage” has 
allowed Xi Jinping to act much more forcefully than Putin against local 
governments’ rent-seeking behaviors.  As a result, while surveys and studies 
suggest that Russia has made little progress in reducing the practice of 
“telephone law” during the span of its judicial reforms, most interviewed 
Chinese judges and lawyers conveyed that they have witnessed a 
considerable drop in external interventions in the past few years due to both 
the new institutional protections and the center’s tightened control over local 
governments.  The comparison thus bolsters the proposed negative 
association between political competition and judicial independence under 
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